Introduction
The idea of this study started up in 2001, during my eight-month fieldwork in Nagorno-Karabakh, de facto Armenian state that was resulted the Azerbaijani-Armenian ethnic conflict. That was unique situation generated by Iron Curtain fall in the social context of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost. The society in Karabakh became multisegmental during the Karabakh movement and war (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , when the area swiftly attracted the most heterogeneous groups including, let us call them natives, with their settled norms and ideas about the nation, honour, masculinity and femininity; Soviet army officers and soldiers (including those of Armenian background) loyal to the Soviet as well as the Armenian state; volunteers from Armenia with distinctly nationalistic views; representatives of the foreign Armenian Diaspora from the USA and European countries and from Middle Eastern countries like Lebanon and Iran. Such a mixture of cultural backgrounds amidst the military confrontation created a context for various alliances and combinations of values and views. Karabakh swiftly became the axes of concentration of the most heterogeneous groups of Armenian patriots.
1 In Karabakh, the interests of all these groups, filled with suspicion and mistrust towards one another (along with a cordial joy and infinite gravity to each other), collided. Misunderstanding and certain emotional aversion could be found on the daily level, on the level of gender relations, as well as on the level of concepts and world views. Among the turbulent judgements of this nature the study's main questions arose. What are the scars and consequences of Cold War in the people's mind? How that long-term global socialism-capitalism resistance forms the image of the USSR assign, Russia? This study has fairly modest aim: 2 to provide an empirically grounded views of image constructions as they are imagined by different layers of Western Armenian Diaspora representatives. The data for this study were collected during my observations and field research in the UK (London, 2003) , the USA (California, Massachusetts, 2006 -2007 , Canada (Ontario, 2007 (Ontario, , 2008 , Switzerland (Zurich, 2008) , Germany (Frankfurt-on-Main, Kaiserslautern, 2008) , the Netherlands (Wassenaar, Amsterdam, 2008) , Belgium (Brussels, St. Niklaas, 2008 , 2010 and Turkey (Istanbul, 2009 (Istanbul, , 2010 . The paper is based on numerous original interviews, conversations, talks and observations, conducted more pointedly mostly in California County, the USA (involving more than 48 research participants/interlocutors). The total numbers of talks and interviews conducted for this project was about 200, out of which at least seven interviews were with the principal research participants, marked with the longitudinal interaction. In historical perspective the image of Armenians in the Russian empire was tersely described by Ronald Suny as that of Christians, as commercial, and as conspiratorial. 3 In the eyes of their imperious and imperial masters, Armenians (and Georgians) were distinguished among the otherwise monogenous Caucasian 'native' masses only by their religious affiliation. 4 The image of Russia and Russians among Armenians is a vexed one, as is the sheer number and variety of sub/ cultural and local groupings that make up the Armenian experience. This includes such criteria as class, gender and age, across various historical periods (the Imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet ages), geographical locations (Armenians in the Middle East, America, Western and Eastern Europe) and political attitudes encompassing the three main political parties (ranging from Dashnaks, or the National Socialists, through to Hnchaks, or the Social Democrats, to Ramkavars, or the Liberals), as well as those who proclaim no political allegiance. Also part of this experience are those who confess their faith and those who are atheist, and the wide divergence of social status, including academics, school teachers, lawyers, public service volunteers, service industry workers, and so on. 5 For the purposes of this paper we will focus on the Armenian diaspora in Europe, the USA and Canada, endeavouring to convey how they see the USSR and Russia, based on the personal testimony of those interviewed. As I am of Armenian descent myself, I was accepted as one of their own and not as a Russian, although those interviewed accepted fully the obligations and advantages of foreign citizenship. The majority of interviews were carried out in an informal environment. Armenians in the Western diaspora have both positive and negative views of Russia and the Russians. It is perhaps relevant to note here that the majority of my interviewees were residents of the state of California (Los Angeles, Glendale, Pasadena, Ensino). These were Armenians who were able to form easy relationships not only with Armenians of the large-scale post-Soviet emigration from Armenia (regarded as embodying Soviet Russian values), but also Russians.
6 It should be added that the reception of these emigres often is coloured by their unedifying attempts to secure material support and their capacity for wheeler-dealing, on both a minor and a large scale. 4 There are interesting parallels here with the collective European categorization of the many and disparate New World social groups as simply 'Indians'. 5 It is interesting that responses from those in the legal sphere were very critical of the crime-ridden image of Russia, accepting that stereotype while those from academia were less judgemental and more analytical. 6 It is also interesting to note that Jews from Russia were also called 'Russians', not, apparently, on ethnic grounds but more as representatives of a very particular way of life and thought. 7 Those residing in the country illegally, and the incredibly disingenuous lengths to which they will go to acquire American citizenship and integration into an American way of life fundamentally at odds with the socialist patterns of behaviour to which they are accustomed, are the subject of a different ethnographic study.
the perceptions of Russians, Jews and especially Armenians from the former USSR, Armenia and Russian Federation. Rose-coloured discourses are ambivalent and, in general, reflect the view that the USSR is to be thanked for the creation of an Armenian state of the Eastern Armenians, even at the expense of allowing Karabakh and Nakhichevan to be unceremoniously ceded in order to contribute to the expansion of the socialist camp and the idea of a single Soviet space. However, the accepted perception is that the historical act of the union of Eastern Armenia with the Soviet state was a choice between the lesser of two evils, while at the same time relations between Armenia and Russia were and continue to be acknowledged as organically genuine, rather than morally abstract, even if dominated by the looming spectre of Big Brother, that tendentious and ideologically-charged metaphor of the Soviet period, as well as the Kremlin policy of forced Russification.
8 Moreover, Russia (as the USSR, with rare exceptions), never took sides with Turkey, the country Armenians regard as the enemy of their blood (arm. voxerim tshnami). The negative perception of Russia also has several levels and socio-political contexts which make it quite a complex issue, but this paper does not claim to be exhaustive or comprehensive in its suggested conclusions.
It is clear that one of the most important issues to bear in mind is the social experience of the repatriates, which we can trace back to the first formation of the Armenian diaspora (in Armenian 'spiurk').
12 The dispersal of Arme- 'an ideologically and politically alien phenomenon' and contacts with it were forbidden. The same policy was followed with regard to the Russian 'White' emigration and was based on the conviction of the Soviet authorities that 'the very fact of residence abroad is sufficient proof of political unreliability'. thousands of Armenian returnees were exiled to the Altai region, and many ended up in the prisons of the Gulag.
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After the death of Stalin in 1953 and the Khrushchev 'thaw' another 30,000 Armenians were repatriated into Armenia. Not everyone thought about settling in Soviet Armenia with such abandon. There were many who wavered and asked their more decisive and devil-may-care relatives to write to them on arrival and tell them if uprooting themselves was worth it the journey. At the same time people were not fully aware of just how all-pervasive the control of the secret police would be. 24 Nevertheless, returnees would find ingenious ways of getting necessary information through to their relatives abroad in letters that would be scrutinized by the KGB, using Aesopian language and/or hints and signs known only to them in otherwise upbeat letters:
'We were very warmly received here. We are very glad that we have arrived, life here is just a fairy-tale. The whole family was immediately settled in new houses and given work. Come and join us as soon as you can.
Our whole family has a very good life here, everyone is pleased, but especially happy is our little Garo...'
When they read this letter, the Armenian relatives living in France unpacked their suitcases because Garo had died in childhood from an infectious disease. In another letter a returnee wrote to his relative: 'Everything here is fine. There is work, we are treated very well, food is also extremely well provided. the opposite meaning of what was intended is achieved. Sometimes dangerous consequences could ensue. For instance, a situation on a construction site as described by Armenuhi Stepanian (based on the different meanings of the words Dzkhi: pull, hold and let go): 'A local labourer says to a returnee: "Pull it towards yourself (Dzkhi, thogh ga)". The returnee answers in confusion: "Let it go on to your head (Intor dzkhem, guluxit kiyna)?"' These differences had social consequences. They formed the criteria for inclusion and exclusion, falseness and genuineness, mainstream culture and marginality, and drew up clear boundaries between groups of Armenians. At that time a special differentiating lexicon emerged, with condescending and disparaging terms such as 'thazha hay' (the 'new' or 'newly well off' Armenian), 'krro' (stubborn, hard-headed), 'yekvor' or 'galma' ('one recently arrived'), 'parzkastantsi' (Iranian), 'gaxthakan' (refugee, colonist).
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The widely used antonym 'axpar' (local disparagement of the Western Armenian pronunciation of the word 'eghbair', meaning 'brother' provides Armenian ethnographers with the justification to speak of the formation of a separate subethnic group of Armenian returnees). 33 The word 'axpar'
was thus used indiscriminately in relation to any newly arrived Armenian. Such distinctions 34 as 'axpar' baptism (aghbarakan knunkh), 'axpar' cuisine (aghbarakan tzash) and 'axparka' (invented by local Russian-speaking Armenians, translated as 'a female returnee') became characteristics of the group, inescapably highlighting their 'otherness'.
Red propaganda:
'in our overseas world we called them "zevzeks"'. Repressions
The processing, or rather transformation, of returnees into Soviet citizens occurred with the help of propaganda, or political re-education. Propagandists and agitators gathered people together for brainwashing and lessons in political literacy. 'Who are they?' the returnees would ask. 'Propagandists and agitators,' would be the reply. 'In our overseas world we called them "zevzeks"' (Menkh mer artasahmany adonts zevzek gsenkh).
Political persecution in Armenia began on 17 June 1949. Wholesale arrests were preceded by exhausting interrogations. 'One returnee was always being called in for interrogation. By that time they had already learned some Russian words. So after another wearying interrogation he gets into a taxi, and the taxi driver asks "Where are we going?", he replies with a shout, "Do you need a report, too?"' 35 A consequence of political repressions was that the third stage of repatriations in the 1960s and 1970s occurred in parallel with the emigration of those who had been arrested returning from internal exile. 'When documents for emigration to the USA were being drawn up, Soviet officials would ask, "Who are your relatives abroad?", to which they received the heartfelt reply: "And did we have relatives in Siberia in 1949?"' (49-in Sibirya ugharketsir, hon harazat unei?) (A. Stepanian).
Nevertheless, emigration seemed almost irrational when one considers the traffic in the opposite direction, occasioned by a romantic patriotism and a nostalgia rooted in what modern sociologists call primordial loyalty. 36 The turbulence of this movement of people is reflected in the story of one Soviet soldier, Private Tsatur, imprisoned by the Germans in the Second World War and who returned to his homeland from the USA nearly twenty years later, despite all the warnings. He had applied to the necessary authorities from his home in the United States, eventually received permission and in 1960s arrived back in the USSR and returned to his native village. 'For about three days they drank and ate what they could, slaughtered some of the animals, the wine flowed like a river. Then on the fourth day the KGB came and took him, and he was given ten years in Magadan for treason. They say that after he returned Tsatur returned to his native village ill and a broken man. The shadowy sides of the Soviet economy and the shortage of consumer goods are the next much discussed theme. Unrealistic Five Year Plans, false statistical data and window dressing provided the real meat of the unreal, fantasy world of the Soviet economy. Heated debates about State statistics and Gosplan as a feature of socialist economic planning are becoming more widespread and exciting interest that makes them the second most popular topic of discussion after tales about the omnipresent KGB. In Los Angeles a friend of mine told an anecdote that he had heard from a politician friend in Soviet Armenia. 'What was the Soviet economy? Well, probably not much has changed even today. A bridge was built over a river. The bridge had 32 Ibid., p. 152. to be guarded, so they hired a watchman. They then hired a cashier to calculate the watchman's wages. Then they hired an accountant to keep the books. And a supervisor had to be hired to provide proper leadership, and so on. But then the word came down that there had to be economies, so they fired the watchman.' 39 Such an economy of absurdity goes some way to explaining to Western Armenians why their Eastern fellowcountrymen accept corruption and 'shady' economic practices as the norm. They see this as the destabilising legacy of the Soviet regime, which has led to a psychology of collective non-responsibility. It is this feature of the Soviet consciousness, they say, that engendered a hollow economy of excessive regulation and poor quality production. 'My parents visit Armenia, in Soviet times that was the thing to do. My mother was told that there was good quality crystal in the Soviet Union. So she went into a shop and asked if they had any crystal on sale. The shop assistant replied no, they didn't, as we could see. There was a local man with us, and he said so can she sell us any from under the counter (dakits). So my mother bought a set of crystal glasses, but to this day we can't understand what this "dakits" means.' (R. Sherbetjian, male aged 57).
Censorship
The infringement of all forms of personal freedom under the Soviets, including the complete censorship of all forms of expression, is a frequent topic of conversation for the overseas Armenians. The intellectuals of the diaspora consider the epitome of absurdity to be the censorship of Soviet musical art. Ronald Suny recounts how the worldfamous composer Aram Khachaturian had to apologise for writing bourgeois music.
3 Thus false standards in economic life are transferred to the spiritual and educational spheres of Soviet life; the stereotype persisted among particularly radical Armenians living abroad considered that nothing of quality could be produced in the Soviet Union because all free or critical thinking was nipped in the bud. This environment could not produce any clear blue sky thinking, they would say, and social sciences were especially afflicted by plagiarism. All of this, of course, was well known to Soviet citizens, thus giving rise to the witticism that 'there are four types of lie: ordinary, brazen, statistics and quotations.' 40 Nevertheless, it is accepted that two areas of activity were the exceptions to the above: classical music and sport. The Soviet culture of rote learning and memorizing is seen as a distinctive feature of the Soviet educational system, giving rise to some universally recited yet dubious compliments, such as 'a nightingale is basically a sparrow that has graduated from the Soviet conservatory. ' But contacts between Soviet Armenians and those living abroad (letters, parcels, telephone conversations) throughout the Soviet and especially the post-Soviet period did not cease. It seemed that the Armenian Soviet republic lived under a particularly benevolent regime and that the Soviet nomenclature were not too bothered about the 'bourgeois' links of Soviet Armenians with the diaspora. During the Khrushchev period and in the 1960s and 1970s Moscow took little action and believed somehow that these contacts contained not a drop of ideology or bourgeois propaganda, but was simply the chattering of relatives.
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This relatively tolerant regime allowed underground shops in Erevan to flourish selling feel-good 'capitalist' wares such as cushions, bobby pins, records, cigarettes and other such 'luxuries', and as a result Erevan gained a semblance of bourgeois comfort and relative prosperity.
This really was an amazing combination of the Communist and the national/nationalistic, the official and the forbidden, the routine active use of Communist ideology for the attainment of healthy and vital ends, without extremes but with some panache. For instance, children in the families of Soviet Armenian state functionaries from an early age would learn the names of members of the Politburo but would also recite for visitors patriotic poems about the great fight of the Armenian forest partisans against the Turks and about how the national hero Serobpasha was poisoned in the mountains of Western Armenia.
The post-Soviet period
Discourses of the post-Soviet period are mainly informal and are linked above all to a way or styles of life and everyday practices. This may mean that post-Soviet rhetoric is less mythologized and based on a direct engagement with actual people, who may be Armenians but who are divided occasionally by the unbreakable Soviet wall of ideology, just as Germans were once divided into East and West.
42 R. Panosian writes about the huge distance between the diaspora and its 'historical homeland', exacerbated by the seven decades of isolation and physical detachment. 43 phases: 1988-1989 (a reluctant working relationship), 1991-1992 (the 'honeymoon'), 1992-1998 (schism and conflict), 1998-1999 (early reconciliation). 44 It is of considerable interest that despite the spontaneous acknowledgement of the contribution of the 'internal diaspora' (the Armenian populations of Russia and other CIS countries) as 'a crucial source of economic help to family members remaining in Armenia', it is otherwise largely ignored or even sharply criticised.
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The profound ambivalence of the diaspora towards postSoviet Russia also lies in the sphere of current migration processes, as expressed very unambivalently in the following quotation: 'After the collapse of the USSR one and a half million Armenians left for Russia. Russia swallows up the Armenian identity and remoulds it, assimilates it. At the same time it's clear that life in Armenia is impossible without remittances from Russia. This is depressing, as it means that Armenia can't function as a state' (Sima Abrahamian, Canada). The current demonization of Russia in the Western media means that 'those who stand against Russia (Georgia, for instance) are cool, and the other way round. Armenia at best therefore remains in the shade, at least for now. But in the French diaspora we are more relaxed (than in the diasporas of other countries)'. 
Communicative styles
Freshness, vitality and sincerity in emotional communication at any time of the day or night, and especially mutual support, is noted among the diaspora as a positive trait in post-Soviet people. 47 At the same time this change is often explained by reference to the sparse joys of Soviet life. In other words, the absence of privacy and the values of collective living as in the archetypal communal apartment are now rejected, no longer do people need a minimalist life style where bare survival is the order of the day. Some Armenians living overseas believe that there remain psychological scars from the Communist past, where the lack of freedom of speech and its associated threats of denunciation, persecution, exile and camps for political prisoners, and other forms of punishment, gave rise to a strange, idiosyncratic and rather dysfunctional form of communication, illustrated by scenes from everyday life. 'To be like everyone else, or be nothing, is one and the same thing. This fear is of literally everything. When asked a simple question, 'how are things?', Armenians from Russia and Armenia reply 'OK (vochinch)'. What does this mean? What does 'OK' (¼nothing) mean? It's a void, emptiness. What kind of style is this? ' (Ourfalian, K.) Alien standards of everyday emotional behaviour which contrast sharply with the optimism and daily 'emotional work' that passes for social obligation, the desire to live among other people and socialise, were expressed in terms of a joke I heard among Armenians from Iran, and reinforce the observation above. If we accept that such a 'minimalist' style of communication is a linguistic calque from Russian into Armenian, then the Russian language is seen as an imposed lingua franca and an embodiment of imperial and colonial intervention.
Eating, dieting and heavy make-up
The stereotypes associated with the shortages of consumer goods, especially food and its poor quality, during the Soviet period, have firm foundations. When the Iron Curtain was up relatives who had returned to Soviet Armenia complained regularly about them, and in the postSoviet period the truth became evident through the possibilities of actual direct contact. But it was this that Armenians of the diaspora felt particularly guarded about. I remember one of my American friends asking in a sort of apologetic and hesitant manner whether it was true that during the Soviet period there were only two types of cheese in the shops, Russian and Poshekhonski. To which I, a bit timidly and looking for the right words, replied that nothing could be further from 44 R. Panosian considers that the clearest sign of 'overcoming the split' was the series of ministerial appointments from among the diaspora, such as Zhiraira Libaridian (advisor to President Levon Ter-Petrosian from 1991 to 1997), Raffi Ovannisian (independent Armenia's first Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1991 Affairs, -1992 , and Sebu Tashdzhian (Energy Minister, 1992) . Later disputes were to take place in the academic sphere, when politically committed Armenian intellectuals went on the offensive to demand a greater voice in discussions on Armenian history that were marred by biased and essentialist readings. As a result of this battle of ideologies many world-famous historians and anthropologists were vilified and became persona non grata. See the 3-h film on YouTube 'The Falsifiers of Armenian History'. 45 'A schoolteacher is reading one of Krylov's fables to her class: "God sent a piece of cheese to a crow..." One of the class asks "Does God really exist?" Another asks "Does cheese really exist?"
The Armenian diaspora had differing ideas about the regional variations in Soviet food provision. For instance, a British Armenian girl visiting the USSR (actually Moscow) on an academic exchange in the early 1980s complained to another Armenian girl on the same exchange who was based in Krasnodar (North Caucasus, the USSR) that she was 'starving to death and was counting the days when she would be going back home'.
48 Soviet citizens themselves believed that foodstuffs, like other consumer goods, were all concentrated in Moscow, where people would converge from all parts of the USSR in search of sausage meat and bananas. Western Armenians are totally disheartened by the habit Eastern Post-Soviet Armenian men have of knocking back hard liquor in one gulp, just as they are by the precise organization of the ceremonial table and the strict hierarchies of toasting and feasting. They are also shocked by the glamour and pretensions of clothing and the overuse of heavy make-up. All of this is blamed on the Russian influence.
Political culture
A different, and presumably lower, political culture enjoyed by one's co-ethnic brethren is another dividing line. Elections are regarded by the majority as the time to cultivate one's network resources and/or improve their material position by selling their votes for a scrap of bread (we note the pre-election manipulation of the peasantry by the members of the Prospering Armenia party and by Gagik Tsarukian, oligarch and member of Parliament). The lack of trust towards political institutions and the absence of any civic tradition, despite the chorused excuses through reference to totalitarianism, the patriarchal order, neopatrimonialism and particularism, are also worrying distinctions to Armenians living abroad. If the future of the Third Armenian Republic is to be guaranteed then it must be unambiguously free of these excuses, an issue which has raised the rhetorical temperature considerably. The huge gulf in civic culture between the Russian and Western diasporas was clearly exposed during discussions about the 2005 law on dual citizenship (between Russia and Armenia). Members of the Western diaspora were shocked to learn that Russian Armenians desperately wanted this law to be adopted not in order to be able to vote for the candidate of their choice in a Presidential or other election, but simply in order to be able to legitimately and safely buy property in Armenia. This bitter pill, according to the Western diaspora, leaves little hope for the development of genuinely neoliberal institutions in the new independent post-Soviet Armenia.
Thus, if we are to sum up our arguments above, we can see that there exists a definite stereotyping and occasionally fetishizing of the concepts and approaches that go towards forming the image of what is Russian. In this construct both negative and positive discourses are cunningly interwoven. The negative discourse amounts to the division and alienation not only of Russian and Western Armenians but also of Western and Eastern Armenians. It is certainly true that this is a result of a long history of migration and diaspora existence, and especially of living through the Soviet experience. It is not fortuitous that the greatest negativity falls on the Soviet period, and this can be easily explained simply through political reasoning, although the Armenian Socialist Republic did not suffer any more than other Soviet republics from the Stalinist repressions and other constraints of the Soviet regime (indeed sometimes less). As can be seen from these interviews, this negative attitude became crystallized in the personal experience of Western Armenians seduced by the blandishments of the Soviet propaganda machine and then cruelly deceived by the State on repatriation.
49 It seems totally irrational that there were some intellectuals of the diaspora who settled in the USSR out of ideological sympathies for socialism, such as the feminist poetess Zabel Esaian, who was later exiled to Siberia (1937 Siberia ( -1943 Zurich, 14.11.2008. 53 McCarthyism was a feature of American public life from the end of the 1940s to the end of the 1950s, accompanied by anti-communist rhetoric and a campaign of persecution of left-leaning intellectuals. The Hollywood blacklist was a list of people working in culture and the arts in the USA in the 1940s and 1950s who were barred from their professions on political grounds. The lists were compiled by the owners of the Hollywood studios and included members of the Communist Party of the USA or those suspected of sympathizing with it, as well as those who refused to help the authorities investigate the Communist Party's activities. The first list was compiled by the studios in 1947 after ten screen writers, known as the 'Hollywood Ten', refused to give evidence to the US Congress Commission on Anti-American Activities. Later all received a one-year prison sentence. Those included on the list suffered great difficulties in getting work and found it impossible to work in the film industry. The lists were dropped after 1960. Many Hollywood films were produced in this period which demonized Soviet citizens.
to the events of 1915, the physical annihilation of the Armenians in Western Armenia, remains the true yardstick with which it is measured by the Armenian diaspora. As has already been said, by the mid-1960s the Armenians of the diaspora had changed their view of the USSR into a more positive one given its position on the Armenian genocide of [1915] [1916] [1917] [1918] [1919] [1920] [1921] [1922] [1923] 
